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Abstract
Today’s pay-as-you-go social security systems are put under pressure due to increasing
life expectancy, the baby boomers generation entering retirement and a decreasing
effective retirement age. In most developed countries workers retire remarkably earlier
than the full retirement age, even if economic reasons suggest not to. Conducting a
large online survey, this paper relates the willingness-to-accept/ willingness-to-pay
disparity to the retirement decision and shows that the presentation of the decision
problem strongly influences the outcome. The willingness-to-accept late retirement is
more than twice as high as the corresponding willingness-to-pay. We also show that
this disparity is driven by loss aversion. Using the reduction in German social security
benefits for early retirement as a market price also shows that the presentation in a
willingness-to-accept frame can induce early retirement. Results are robust when the
analysis is repeated with a representative panel survey for Germany (SAVE panel).
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1. Introduction
40 years ago the time spent in retirement for an average German employee was
about 10 years, whereas this number almost doubled until today. The lifespan after
retirement steadily increases due to an increasing life expectancy and a decreasing
effective retirement age. The decision when to retire and claim social security benefits
therefore becomes more and more important as it influences a person’s well-being for
many years. The German social security system allows people to claim benefits when
they first reach the age of 63. However, similar to the US social security system,
retiring before the full retirement age (FRA) of 67 is possible, but results in a constant
decrease of pension benefits for the rest of one’s life. For example, retiring at age
63 instead of 67 reduces monthly benefits by about 22%, making the retirement
decision one of the most economically important decisions in general1. Despite the
financial incentive to delay retirement and claiming benefits, the majority of workers
in most developed countries choose to retire early (see for example Behaghel and Blau,
2012; Gruber and Wise, 2004; Boersch-Supan, 2000). In Germany, for example, more
than 65% of employees retiring in 2011 did so before reaching their full retirement
age2. This implies that, among other factors, the reduction in monthly social security
payments provides not enough incentive to postpone retirement. The price for early
retirement therefore is smaller than the reservation price of those individuals.
In this paper, we focus on the reservation price for early retirement. The reserva-
tion price for a good can be elicited as the minimum price at which someone would be
willing to accept selling the good. Also, the maximum price someone would be willing
to pay can be regarded as the reservation price. Standard economic theory predicts
that the willingness-to-accept (WTA) and willingness-to-pay (WTP) should not differ
if there are no income effects and transaction costs (Willig, 1976). However, there is
striking evidence that the WTA can be between 2 and about 100 times larger than
the WTP, depending on the good for which reservation prices are elicited (for a de-
tailed overview of the WTA/WTP literature see Horowitz and McConnell, 2002). For
example, endowing participants with a coffee mug and eliciting selling prices (WTA)
1The reduction of 22% is calculated as the reduction due to retiring earlier than the FRA (−4 ·
3.6% = 14.4%) and the reduction due to less accumulated earning points (≈ 7.6%). See section 2
for a detailed description.
2Source: Statistik der deutschen Rentenversicherung 2012. The FRA for employes retiring in
2011 was 65.
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leads to reservation prices about twice as high as when participants are asked for a
buying price (WTP) for the same mug (Kahneman et al., 1990). This difference is
too big to be explained by an income effect, suggesting that the elicitation method of
reservation prices directly influences the outcome.
Every worker is naturally endowed with a full and an earliest possible retirement
age, where early retirement in this study is considered as tradeable. The price for
early retirement is measured in the change in monthly social security benefits. The
“market price” in the German social security system for retiring 1 month earlier than
the FRA is c.p. 0.3% of monthly benefits3. Depending on whether the full retirement
age or an earlier retirement age is used as a reference point, the decision can be seen
as a willingness-to-pay or willingness-to-accept problem. The official information by
the German government about social security payments includes both, information
about payments at the full and the earliest retirement age. This is therefore one of few
economically meaningful problems that is naturally presented in a WTA and WTP
framework.
To study the WTA/WTP difference in a retirement context, a large online survey
in cooperation with one of the biggest German newspapers, “Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung” (FAZ), has been conducted (FAZ-survey). Participants answered a set of
demographic and retirement related questions. They were randomly assigned to one
of two different treatments (between subjects). In the willingness-to-pay treatment
subjects indicated the maximum amount of monthly benefits they would be willing to
give up in order to retire at the earliest age possible (63) instead of the full retirement
age (67). In the willingness-to-accept treatment, in contrast, the minimum increase
of monthly payments in order to delay retirement from age 63 to age 67 was elicited.
Thereby, in both treatments, participants were given hypothetical monthly benefits as
a reference point amounting to 65% of their current income (level 1). In a consecutive
question (within subjects) participants answered the same question again but for a
hypothetical pension value of 110% of their current income (level 2).
Our data shows that the reservation price for early retirement in the WTA treat-
ment is about two times higher than in the WTP treatment. Most important, when
compared to the fair price (according to the social security system) the WTA on
average lies above the fair price whereas the average WTP is below the fair price indi-
3Section 2 of this paper provides an overview on how social security benefits are calculated.
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cating that early retirement is attractive only in the WTA treatment. Using logistic
regression, we find that the probability of retiring early is on average increased by
about 17 to 30 percentage points in the WTA treatment. The result is robust to the
inclusion of various control variables including risk aversion, loss aversion, financial
literacy and planned retirement age. Also results are confirmed using a representative
panel survey dataset for Germany (SAVE panel).
In a second step, the cause of the WTA/WTP disparity is analyzed. In most
studies, the disparity is attributed to loss aversion (e.g. Thaler, 1980; Kahneman et al.,
1990; Bateman et al., 1997). We compare participants self reported loss aversion with
their WTA and WTP, respectively. The WTA/WTP ratio indeed increases strongly
with loss aversion, however, this increase is caused by a decreasing WTP, the WTA is
not influenced by loss aversion. Participants seem to perceive the exchange of money
for early retirement as a loss and therefore are willing to pay less the more loss averse
they are.
This study contributes to two strands of literature. We show that the WTA/WTP
disparity also exists in a retirement context for the good of early retirement. Also,
so far there is no study that directly relates an empirical measure of loss aversion
to a measure of WTA and WTP. The most important contribution concerns the lit-
erature on retirement planing. The majority of past research focuses on economic,
socio-economic and health considerations when explaining the retirement decision
(e.g. Boersch-Supan, 2000; Lund et al., 2001; Decshryvere, 2006). Other factors be-
yond economical considerations are often neglected. It seems plausible, however, that
behavioral factors, which proof to have a strong influence on retirement saving and
planning (see for example Benartzi and Thaler, 2007) also affect the decision when to
retire. Thereby, the WTA/WTP disparity is of particular interest for two reasons: 1)
policy makers can easily change the presentation format of the retirement decision.
For example, in Germany the government provides information about social security
benefits by a yearly information letter. Small changes to that letter could change the
way people think about the retirement decision (WTA vs. WTP). The same holds
for the US Social Security Administration (SSA), which provides information on the
impact of different claiming ages. 2) The presentation format has a strong impact.
In our study, on average, participants in the WTA scenario implicitly decide to retire
early. In contrast, WTP participants implicitly choose to postpone retirement. This
effect is significant and survives various robustness tests. Our findings are also in
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line with related studies, which use the planned retirement age as variable of interest.
Fetherstonhaugh and Ross (1999) show, that presenting the retirement decision in a
loss frame results in significantly higher planned retirement ages. Also Brown et al.
(2013) elicit a hypothetical retirement age and find that especially a gain vs. loss
frame and different reference ages significantly influence the planned retirement age.
2. Social Security in Germany
The German pension system, dating back to 1891, was the first formal pension sys-
tems in the world (Coppola and Wilke, 2010). The pay-as-you-go system is based on
earnings points (EP) where the accumulated points determine the monthly social secu-
rity payments after claiming. For each year a person is employed he or she earns points
in relation to his or her yearly gross income (EPt =
gross incomet
average gross income in Germanyt
)4.
When claiming social security the sum over all earnings points is multiplied by the
current pension value in Germany and an entry coefficient, depending on the persons
claiming age5. The pension value is determined on the 1st of July each year and
amounts to EUR 28.14 for 2013. The entry coefficient equals 1 for people who claim
at their full retirement age (FRA) and is decreased by 0.003 for each month a person
claims before the FRA. Delaying claiming, however, increases the entry coefficient
by 0.005 per month delay. In 2007 the pension system was reformed and a stepwise
increase of the FRA from 65 to 67 was resolved. The increase started 2012 for people
born after 1946. The FRA is increased from 65 to 66 in steps of one month per year
of birth for people being born from 1947 - 1958 and from 66 to 67 in steps of two
month per year of birth for people being born from 1959 - 1964. For cohorts born
after 1963 the new FRA of 67 is effective6. Similar to the German system, claiming
social security and leaving the workforce in the US has not to happen at the same
time. However, in Germany as well as in the US most people claim social security
when leaving the workforce (Greenwald et al., 2010). Therefore, we follow Brown
et al. (2013) and keep the survey as simple as possible and do not distinguish between
retiring and claiming social security.
4The EP per year are capped at 2.1066.
5The pension formula is explained in detail in the following legal text: §64, SGB VI.
6For a more detailed view on the German pension system and the 2007 reform see Wilke (2009)
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3. Hypotheses
3.1. WTA/WTP
WTA/WTP Disparity
In general, a reservation price for a given good can be defined in two ways: 1) as
the maximum price a person would be willing to pay for this good or 2) the minimum
price a person would demand in order to sell the good. In both cases, the economic
rent for the person who buys or sells the good would be zero. Standard theory implies
that, neglecting income effects and transaction costs, for most goods the willingness-
to-accept should equal the willingness-to-pay (Willig, 1976). However, experimental
studies report a significant difference between the WTA and WTP with the WTA
being between two and about 100 times larger than the WTP, depending on the type
of good (see Horowitz and McConnell, 2002). For example Kahneman et al. (1990)
conduct an experiment where half of the subjects are endowed with a Cornell Uni-
versity coffee mug and participants are allowed to trade the mugs among each other.
The average minimum selling price (WTA) was more than two times greater than the
average maximum buying price (WTP), resulting in a very low trading volume. This
effect of high WTA/WTP ratios has been widely observed and on average cannot
be explained by an income effect. Horowitz and McConnell (2002) conduct a meta-
analysis including 45 studies which all report WTA/WTP ratios significantly greater
than one. They find that the high WTA/WTP ratio is not significantly different for
real money experiments and hypothetical questions, that the effect is not the result
of experimental design features that would be suspect and that for “ordinary market
goods” the effect gets weaker7.
WTA/WTP and Social Security
The importance of the WTA/WTP difference is mostly discussed in the context
of property rights and environmental policy (see e.g. Horowitz and McConnell, 2002;
Knetsch, 1990). However, the retirement context provides an interesting framework
as every worker is naturally endowed with a full and earliest possible retirement age.
Depending on how retirement information is provided, the decision is framed as a
WTA or WTP problem. Assume early retirement is the good of interest for which
a reservation price, in form of reduction of monthly payments compared to regular
7see Horowitz and McConnell (2002) p. 427ff.
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retirement, is considered. If the information on how the retirement age will influence
benefits takes the full retirement age as a starting point, people are automatically
put in a WTP framework. The reference point then would be the full retirement age
and the good early retirement would not be “in possession” of the decision maker.
Thinking about early retirement, the decision maker has to ask him- or herself “what
amount of monthly benefits am I willing to give up in order to retire early”. On
the other hand, if the earliest possible retirement age is used as a starting point
the question would be “what amount of monthly benefits would compensate me for
retiring later (working longer)” and the decision would be a WTA problem.
In Germany, the official information about social security payments is provided by
the government. It provides information about the current account value, the current
monthly benefits and an estimate of monthly benefits at full retirement age. Also the
earliest possible date to claim social security and resulting benefits are mentioned and
the calculation of benefits is explained (see Appendix A). Depending on which part
people put most attention the full or earliest retirement age is salient. Therefore, the
retirement decision in Germany is naturally presented in both, a willingness-to-accept
and willingness-to-pay frame.
In the US the Social Security Administration (SSA) provides information on the
impact of different claiming ages. Until 2008 the approach used by the SSA was the
so called “break-even analysis”. People were given the amount of monthly benefits
they would receive if they claim at the earliest age possible. This is then compared to
different later claiming ages with higher monthly benefits and it is calculated how long
one has to live to break even (see Brown et al., 2013). This approach puts individuals
in a willingness-to-accept frame as the starting or reference point of the analysis is the
earliest claiming age possible. Delaying claiming (selling early retirement) increases
monthly benefits by some fixed amount (selling price). Since 2009 the SSA uses a
more neutral way of presenting information about the social security system. However,
according to Brown et al. (2013) the break even analysis is still widely used not only
by SSA filed offices but also by private financial advisers.
3.2. Hypothesis 1
The WTA/WTP difference has been reported for numerous goods including public
or non-market goods (e.g. density of trees, Brookshire and Coursey, 1987), health and
safety goods (e.g. health risk of insecticides, Viscusi et al., 1987), ordinary private
goods (e.g. coffee mugs, Kahneman et al., 1990), risky and ambiguous lotteries (e.g.
7
Eisenberger and Weber, 1995; Harless, 1989) and intangible goods (e.g. travel time,
Ramjerdi and Dilln, 2007). In all these studies the WTA/WTP-ratio has been found
to be significantly greater than one. Nevertheless, to our knowledge the relation
between WTA/WTP has not been studied in a retirement context. It is difficult to
assign the good of early retirement to one of the categories mentioned above. On the
one hand deciding when to retire has features of a lottery, as it is an intertemporal
decision under uncertainty where one does not know how long one will live (and
therefore also the time spend in retirement is unknown). On the other hand it also
could be considered as a good which affects individuals health status (depending on
the kind of employment) which falls in the category of an intangible assets. As the
WTA
WTP ratio depends on the kind of good considered, it is difficult to hypothesize about
the exact magnitude of the ratio for early retirement. That is why we keep hypothesis
1 as simple as possible and state:
H1a: The reservation price for early retirement in the willingness-to-
accept treatment will be significantly higher than the reservation price in
the willingness-to-pay treatment.
The difference of our study to the studies of Fetherstonhaugh and Ross (1999)
and Brown et al. (2013), who investigate framing effects on the retirement decision, is
that we do not ask for a planned or expected retirement age but for a willingness-to-
accept or willingness-to-pay for early retirement. This procedure allows us to compare
subjects reservation prices with the actuarial fair price. In both treatments (WTA
and WTP) a reservation price greater than the fair price indicates that the participant
would choose to retire early.
H1b: Participants in the willingness-to-accept treatment are more likely to
choose early retirement than participants in the willingness-to-pay treat-
ment.
3.3. Hypothesis 2
Even if the WTA/WTP disparity has been studied for almost forty years, the
source of the disparity is not well understood. Several explanations have been put
forward. Randall and Stoll (1980) and Brookshire et al. (1980) suggest that trans-
action costs can cause the maximum amount someone would be willing to pay to be
smaller than the amount he or she would be willing to accept. They argue that when
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someone builds a price for a good in a WTA treatment, he or she adds the transaction
or search costs associated with replacing that good to the reservation price. Other
economic explanations that are suggested by Hanemann (1991) are income effects
and substitution effects. If the value of the considered good is high, owning the good
(WTA) causes an income effect which leads to a higher reservation price. However,
WTA/WTP disparity is also found for low value goods like coffee mugs (see Kahne-
man et al., 1990). Also Horowitz and McConnell (2003) study the income effect as
possible explanation and conclude that “[. . . ] the ratio WTA/WTP is too high to be
consistent with neoclassical preferences”.
As economic reasons lack to fully explain the huge differences between WTA and
WTP, also psychological and methodological reasons are studied. Plott and Zeiler
(2005) suggest subjects misconception as an alternative explanation. They conduct
an experiment, where they simultaneously control for all dimensions of concern over
possible subject misconceptions found in the literature and find no difference between
elicited WTA and WTP. On the other hand, Loomes and Sugden (1982) argue that
ambiguity can cause the WTA/WTP disparity. A risk averse person might increase
the selling price of a good if he or she is not sure about its value. Additionally the
experiment design itself can possibly cause the effect. In Bateman and Willis (2002)
several explanations are put forward. They argue that, among other reasons, an open
end question design can cause the observed effect.
The most prominent explanation put forward for the WTA/WTP disparity, how-
ever, is an endowment effect in combination with loss aversion. Thaler (1980) called
the WTA/WTP disparity an endowment effect stemming from loss aversion. People
have a higher reservation price for a good that is in their possession because giv-
ing up this good is perceived as a loss. This interpretation is put forward by most
WTA/WTP studies (e.g. Thaler, 1980; Knetsch and Sinden, 1984; Coursey et al.,
1987; Borges and Knetsch, 1998; Knetsch et al., 2001; Brown, 2005). Surprisingly,
to our knowledge, there is no study that relates the WTA/WTP-ratio to a direct
measure of loss aversion.
The basic idea is simple: the more loss averse a person is, the less willing he or she
is to give up a good in his or her possession. For the WTA/WTP ratio, we therefore
hypothesize the following:
H2a: The more loss averse participants are, the higher the WTA/WTP
ratio.
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In a second step we focus on the effect of loss aversion on the WTA and WTP
separately. The argument put forward by most former studies implies that selling a
good creates a loss and buying creates a gain (see Brown, 2005). However, there is
an ongoing debate, whether money outlays are also perceived as a loss. Kahneman
et al. (1990) and Novemsky and Kahneman (2005) argue that giving up goods, which
are intended to be exchanged (e.g. money) are not evaluated as losses. Following this
argument loss aversion should only influence the WTA decision. In contrast, Bateman
et al. (1997) and Bateman et al. (2005) find that the WTA/WTP disparity is caused by
both, loss aversion in the good (WTA) and in money (WTP). To introduce hypothesis
2b we follow the argument of Bateman et al. (1997) and Bateman et al. (2005). Table
1 gives an overview about the hypothesized influence of loss aversion on WTA and
WTP.
[Table 1 about here.]
The effect of loss aversion on the WTA should be the opposite of the effect on the
WTP.
H2b: The increase of the WTA/WTP ratio in loss aversion is caused by
both, an increase of WTA and a decrease of WTP.
4. Survey Design and Summary Statistics
4.1. Survey Design
Subject Recruitment and General Procedure
An online survey was conducted from October 14th to November 5th 2012 in
cooperation with the “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung” (FAZ). The survey covered
the field of retirement savings and planing. Summary statistics and control variables
are also presented in Schreiber and Weber (2013). Therefore, this section gives a
detailed overview of the WTA/WTP related questions and only a brief overview of
the summary statistics and control variables.
Subjects were recruited through a link on the newspapers homepage and two an-
nouncements (on October 14th and 28th) in the print edition. 3,077 participants
completed the survey in on average eleven minutes. Participants answered hypo-
thetical questions about retirement planning and time preferences, and also data on
demographics, risk preferences, financial literacy and some additional controls were
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collected. In particular, the survey asked for a reservation price regarding early re-
tirement in a willingness-to-pay and a willingness-to-accept treatment. We choose
hypothetical, non incentivized questions for three reasons: 1) this design allows us to
corporate with the FAZ newspaper and recruit a large subject pool. 2) Rubinstein
(2001) replicated more than 40 experiments without monetary rewards and in almost
all cases there were no qualitative differences in results compared to incentivized ex-
periments. 3) and more specific to our research question Kuehberger et al. (2002) find
that framing effects in hypothetical and real decisions do not substantially differ and
also Horowitz and McConnell (2002) state that this is also true for the willingness-
to-accept/willingness-to-pay difference in particular.
Willingness-To-Accept treatment
In experimental economics, one has to distinguish between choice based and
matching based approaches (see for example Hardisty et al., 2013). Choice meth-
ods ask participants to choose between two outcomes. Thereby one of the outcomes
is constantly increased (or decreased) to find participants switching point, which is
then used to calculate a lower and a upper bound for the variable of interest (e.g. a
reservation price, a discount rate, . . . ). The matching approach in contrast directly
asks for indifference points. Participants have to state which outcome would make
them indifferent to a second outcome. This has the advantage that not only an upper
and lower bound can be calculated. Therefore, in our survey we choose the matching
based approach. In the WTA treatment participants are asked to state an amount of
money by which their monthly pension payment would have to increase (reservation
price) for them to retire 4 years later:
Suppose you have the opportunity to retire at age 63. At this time you
would receive a pension of EUR y per month. Please imagine that you
would be able to delay retirement by four years and retire at age 67. This
would lead to an increase in monthly pension payments. What would the
minimum monthly increase have to be, so that you would be willing to
delay retirement from age 63 to age 67?
Thereby, the given monthly pension of y depends on participants income. In a first
scenario y amounted to 65% (=level 1) and in a consecutive scenario (within subjects)
y was increased to 110% (=level 2) of participants income. Subjects then entered the
amount they additionally demanded. We choose these numbers for two reasons: 1)
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the average monthly social security benefits for an individual, who has been employed
for 40 years with an income of 1.5 times the average income for Germany, amounts to
about 65% of his or her monthly income8. We choose a higher than average income
as a starting point, as the readers of the FAZ typically earn a higher than average
income (see Mueller and Weber, 2011). 2) Simply multiplying subjects current income
by 0.65 has the disadvantage that real income growth until retirement is neglected
and younger participants will face a decision problem with a very low hypothetical
pension. Therefore the second question within subjects is introduced for robustness.
Willingness-To-Pay treatment
In the WTP treatment participants are asked to state an amount of monthly
pension payments they would be willing to give up in order to retire 4 years earlier:
Suppose you have the opportunity to retire at age 67. At this time you
would receive a pension of EUR y per month. Please imagine that you
would be able to speed up retirement by four years and retire at age 63. This
would lead to a decrease in monthly pension payments. What maximum
amount of monthly pension payments would you be willing to give up in
order to be able to retire at age 63 instead of age 67?
Thereby, the monthly pension of y was calculated in the same way as for the WTA
scenario. In the level 1 (level 2) question y amounted to 65% (110%) of participants
income. Subjects then entered the amount they would be willing to give up.
Loss aversion
We use participants self-reported loss attitude to proxy for loss aversion. Earlier
studies find that self-reported risk attitude on a Likert scale is a good predictor of
actual risk taking (see e.g. van Rooij et al., 2011; Nosic and Weber, 2010). On a
seven-point Likert scale participants have to indicate whether they agree to the state-
ment “I’m very afraid of losses” as a measure of loss aversion.
Controls
8Monthly benefits are calculated according to the pension formula presented in section 2. This
calculation is sensitive to assumptions regarding tax payments, martial status, number of kids and
other demographic factors.
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Participants risk aversion is elicited similar to loss aversion on a seven-point Likert
scale. Participants indicate whether they agree to the statement “I’m a risk averse
person”. In addition, the planned retirement age is elicited directly, and participants
are asked “at what age do you plan to retire?” Participants also answer six financial
literacy questions consisting of one of the basic questions from Lusardi and Mitchell
(2007), three advanced questions from van Rooij et al. (2011) and two more com-
plicated questions developed by us (see Appendix B). We do so because the FAZ
newspaper has a focus on financial markets and previous studies find that subjects
with similar characteristics are remarkably financially literate (see Mueller and We-
ber, 2011). Additional controls are participants subjective life expectancy (elicited
directly) and participants indicate if they own private pension insurance as well as
how they rate the certainty of social security benefits guaranteed by the government
today.
4.2. Summary Statistics
Table 2 presents summary statistics. Numer of observations range from 2,142
to 2,297. The following observations were excluded: Participants who were already
retired, participants with zero or missing income9 and participants with age below
18.
The average reservation price for early retirement is about EUR 550 per month in
the 65% treatment (level 1) and about EUR 970 in the 110% treatment (level 2). In
both cases the median is considerably lower, indicating a positive skewness (skewness:
5.30 for level 1 and 4.32 for level 2). Also the increase from level 1 to level 2 is almost
linear with the mean being 1.77 times greater for level 2 and the hypothetical monthly
pension being 110%65% = 1.69 times greater. The average planned retirement age of about
64.58 years is close to the former full retirement age in Germany (65).
[Table 2 about here.]
The average age is about 40 years. Men are overrepresented (84% male) reflecting
the fact that the majority of FAZ readers are male (62%) and that men are more
likely to participate in online surveys of our kind (see Mueller and Weber, 2011).
Subjects report a relatively high after tax income of about EUR 3,400 (median 3,000)
9This was necessary as the income was used to calculate a hypothetical pension value, see section
4.1.
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per month (compared to a German average after tax income of about EUR 1,470
in 201110) and are well educated with 92% having received the German equivalent
to a high school diploma and 68% having graduated from a university. Half of the
participants are married.
Asking participants about their risk- and loss aversion on a 1 to 7 Likert scale leads
to an average of 3.87 and 4.32 respectively. As expected, participants did extremely
well in standard financial literacy questions with on average 3.51 / 4 correct answers.
However, only 0.61 / 2 answers of the additional questions are correct. Directly asking
participants about their subjective life expectancy leads to estimates which, with an
average of 83.33 years for male participants, are above the average life expectancy
in Germany and, with 84.33 for female participants, are close to the average life
expectancy. Given the on average wealthier and more educated sample, a self reported
life expectancy above the population average is a realistic estimate11.
5. Survey Results
5.1. The fair price of early retirement and the fair WTA/WTP disparity
Analyzing the WTA/WTP disparity in a retirement context has the advantage,
that reservation prices can be compared to a fair market price provided by the so-
cial security system. However, this also makes things more complicated, as in our
survey design the fair price depends on the treatment (WTA vs. WTP). This is
best illustrated by a simple example: assume two participants with an income of
W = EUR 1, 000, whereof one is assigned to the WTA treatment an the other one
to the WTP treatment. Both participants are given a hypothetical pension value of
y = 0.65 ·W = 0.65 · 1000 = 650 for the level 1 question. According to the German
social security formula (§64, SGB VI; presented in section 2), it is implicitly assumed
that for both participants 650 = EP · EC · CPV with EP being the accumulated
earning points, EC being the entry coefficient and CPV being the current pension
value. To calculate the fair price, three assumptions have to be made: 1) We assume
for each participant that he or she has been employed for 40 years when reaching an
age of 63. 2) it is assumed that the relation between participants income and the
10Source: German Federal Statistical Office 2012.
11For a more detailed description of summary statistics of this survey see Schreiber and Weber
(2013).
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average income in Germany is constant. Therefore, an additional year of employment
increases the earning points by 1/40. 3) A full retirement age of 67 is assumed.
In the WTA treatment the fair price for delaying retirement by four years has to
be calculated. The entry coefficient now increases from 0.856 to 1 and the earning
points increase by 10%. The fair increase in monthly benefits therefore would be
1
0.856 · 1.1 − 1 = 28.50%, resulting in EUR 185.3. Correspondingly, the fair decrease
in the WTP treatment is calculated as 1 − 0.856 · 11.1 = 22.18% resulting in EUR
144.2. Therefore, the fair WTA/WTP ratio would be 185.3144.2 = 1.285. This is true for
all income levels W . We account for this in two ways: 1) the empirically obtained
WTA/WTP ratio is compared to the fair ratio of 1.285 and not to a ratio of one.
2) the fair price is included in the regression analysis to test, whether the treatment
affects the reservation price beyond the fair price.
5.2. Hypothesis 1a - the WTA/WTP difference
Figure 1 presents the reservation price for early retirement of participants in the
willingness-to-accept and willingness-to-pay treatment as well as the WTA/WTP ra-
tio and the fair ratio of 1.285. The average monthly amount participants additionally
demand to retire at age 67 instead of age 63 (WTA) is EUR 763.56 if the hypothetical
pension value y amounts to 65% of participants income (Level 1). On the other hand,
the monthly amount participants are willing to give up in order to retire at age 63
instead of age 67 (WTP) only amounts to EUR 327.09 at level 1. This difference is
highly significant (t-value of -12.68). The WTAWTP -ratio is 2.33. The p-value of a Wald
test, comparing the WTA/WTP ratio to a ratio of 1.285, is smaller than 0.0001.
Almost the same picture emerges for the level 2 question where the hypothetical pen-
sion value y is increased to 110% of participants income. The reservation price in the
WTA treatment (1275.38) is about 1.9 times higher compared to the WTP treatment
(668.66). Again the difference is significant on the 1%-level (t-value: -9.33, not re-
ported) and the ratio of 1.9 is also significantly higher than 1.285 (Wald test p-value:
< 0.0001). The small decrease in WTAWTP -ratio from level 1 to level 2 is caused by a
disproportional increase of the WTP compared to the increase of y. From level 1 to
level 2 y is increased by 1.10.65 − 1 = 69.23%. The WTA increases almost proportional
(+67.03%). However, the WTP increases more strongly from EUR 327.09 to 668.66
(+104.43%) causing the WTAWTP -ratio to decline from 2.33 to 1.91. Results are similar
for the median reservation price. For the level 1 treatment a median WTA/WTP
ratio of 2.5 is obtained. Also, the ratio declines in the level 2 treatment to 1.5. A
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ratio of about two is on average observed for lotteries (see table IIIA in Horowitz and
McConnell, 2002), whereas health and safety goods exhibit a much higher average
ratio of about 10. As the good early retirement has features of a lottery our result is
in line with the previous literature.
[Figure 1 about here.]
The WTA/WTP difference is further tested in a regression framework. Figure 2 shows
the distribution of the reservation price for the full sample (not separated by WTA and
WTP) as well as of logarithmized reservation prices for level 1 and 2. The distribution
of the reservation price (upper row) resembles the log-normal distribution. Therefore,
the logarithmized reservation prices (bottom row) are used in all further regressions12.
[Figure 2 about here.]
Columns 2 and 4 of table 3 present coefficients of an OLS regression with the loga-
rithmized reservation price as dependent variable, columns 3 and 5 the corresponding
t-values. In addition to the treatment dummy demographic (including the logarith-
mized fair price) and control variables are included13. The main result from figure
1 can be confirmed. For both, level 1 and level 2, the reservation price is signif-
icantly higher in the WTA treatment (significant on 1%-level). This WTA/WTP
effect therefore survives the inclusion of the fair price. The interpretation of the mag-
nitude of the effect is not straightforward. For a continuous variable, the coefficient
multiplied by 100 gives the percentage effect of that variable on the dependent vari-
able. However, this is not true for dummy variables. Therefore, we calculate effects
according to Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980) and Kennedy (1981)14. For the level 1
regression (columns 2 and 3) this leads to a reservation price for early retirement in
the WTA treatment that is 313.55% higher compared to the WTP treatment15. For
level 2 (columns 4 and 5) the reservation price increases by 110.29%. Therefore, the
12Participants who indicated a reservation price of 0 EUR are treated as if they indicated a price
of 1 EUR and the logarithmized reservation price is set to zero. In section 6 we repeat the analysis
without participants who indicate a reservation price of zero.
13Participants income is not included in this regression as the fair price by construction is highly
correlated (correlation of 0.9899) with income.
14The effect is calculated as exp(d̂ − 1
2
V (d̂)) − 1. With d̂ being the estimated coefficient of the
dummy variable and V (d̂) being the variance of the estimate.
15exp(1.4226 − 1
2
0.0773442) − 1 = 313.55%. For all following regressions, with a logarithmized
dependent variable, the effect of dummy variables are calculated similarly.
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WTA/WTP effect is not only robust to the inclusion of additional variables but also
gets stronger in the level 1 regression, as the percentage increase of the reservation
price for level 1 is 233% when only the mean reservation price is taken into account
(see figure 1). The treatment influences participants reservation prices beyond the
effect it has on the fair price. In summary hypothesis 1a can be confirmed.
[Table 3 about here.]
Besides the treatment, the fair price for early retirement influences participants
reservation price. The fair price is calculated depending on participants income. A
1% increase in the fair price (corresponding to a 1% increase in income) will increase
the reservation price on average by 0.51% for level 1 and by EUR 0.45% for level 2.
As for a 1% increase in income the reservation price increases less strongly (< 1%),
the relative reservation price (reservation price in relation to participants income)
decreases with an increase of income. For robustness, we also repeat the analysis
with the relative reservation price calculated as reservationpriceincome and obtain the same
results as presented in table 3 (results not reported).
Also, participants who graduated from university indicate a reservation price that
is on average 12.13% (level 1) or 17.84% (level 2) higher, compared to participants
with no university degree. In both regressions being married increases the reservation
price. This is in line with Lund et al. (2001) who find that having a partner is a
significant predictor of transition to early retirement. In our analysis being married
(dummy variable) increases the reservation price for early retirement by 30.94% (level
1) and 29.78% (level 2), respectively.
Additionally, only one of the eight control variables proofs to be significant. Partic-
ipants planned retirement age has a significant and negative effect on the reservation
price. For each year a person plans to retire later, the reservation price is decreased
by 6.4% and 5.6%. This effect makes intuitively sense: Participants who have already
planned to retire late should have a weaker preference for early retirement compared
to a person who plans to retire early and therefore should have a lower reservation
price. The effect of loss aversion is not significant in both regressions. However, as it
is stated by hypothesis 2b that loss aversion influences the WTA and WTP differently,
this is not surprising as participants in the WTA and WTP scenario are pooled in
these regressions.
17
5.3. Hypothesis 1b - probability of early retirement
Whether or not the WTA/WTP disparity can induce early retirement depends
on the reservation price in relation to the fair price. If the fair price is smaller than
the reservation price people are willing to buy the good. The fair price for early
retirement can be measured in reduction of monthly social security benefits due to
early retirement. Figure 3 shows the average WTA, WTP and the average fair price
in both treatments. As the average sample income is high, also high fair prices
of 631.22 and 500.05 (level 1) and 1068.23 and 846.24 (level 2) are obtained. The
average reservation price in the WTA scenario is for both levels above the average
fair price, indicating that under the WTA treatment early retirement seems attractive.
In contrast, the average reservation price in the WTP treatment is below the fair price
for both scenarios. This gives a first impression on how the WTA/WTP disparity can
induce early retirement.
[Figure 3 about here.]
To test hypothesis 1b in a regression framework an indicator variable, late retirement,
is constructed. For each participant the fair price of early retirement is calculated and
compared to his or her reservation price. The indicator equals one if the reservation
price is smaller than the fair price, indicating that early retirement is not desirable.
For a reservation price higher than the fair price the indicator equals zero. Columns
2 and 4 of table 4 now present coefficients of a logistic regression of late retirement
as dependent variable on demographics, the WTA dummy and additional control
variables. Columns 3 and 5 present the corresponding z-values. The WTA treatment
dummy is highly significant (1%-level) and negative, indicating that the probability
of late retirement decreases if the decision is presented in the WTA treatment. Also
in terms of magnitude the effect is strong. The average marginal effect (over all
observations) of a change in the WTA dummy is -29.46% (level 1) and -17.84% (level
2), respectively. The probability for retiring late therefore decreases on average by
29.46 (17.84) percentage points in the WTA scenario.
Income and having graduated from university are two out of seven demographic
variables with a significant effect in both regressions. Even though income (indirectly
measured by the fair price for early retirement) increases the reservation price for
early retirement (see table 3), it also increases the probability of late retirement. To
understand this effect the calculation of the fair price has to be considered. The fair
price according to the German pension formula, increases linearly with income. The
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reservation price also increases with income, however, less strongly. Therefore, the
positive effect of income on the probability of late retirement is obtained. Previous
research also finds that wages are inversely correlated with the acceptance of early
retirement (Ruhm, 1989; Kim and Feldman, 1998). The effect of having a university
degree on the probability of late retirement is in line with its effect on the reservation
price. Participants with a university degree have a higher reservation price for early
retirement and are therefore also more likely to retire early. Also, for the planned
retirement age the effect is unchanged. The higher the planned retirement age the
higher is the probability of late retirement.
[Table 4 about here.]
In summary hypothesis 1b can be confirmed. The probability of late retirement is
significantly reduced when the decision problem is presented in a willingness-to-accept
treatment compared to a willingness-to-pay treatment. Combined with the fact that
in Germany as well as in the US information regarding retirement often is presented
with the earliest retirement age as a starting point, the WTA/WTP disparity (among
many other factors) can help to better understand why people retire on average before
the full retirement age.
5.4. Hypothesis 2a - WTA/WTP ratio and loss aversion
To analyze the effect of loss aversion on the WTA/WTP ratio, an average reser-
vation price per participant is calculated. As each participant indicates a reservation
price in the level 1 question (y=65% of participants income) and a second reservation
price in the level 2 question (y=110% of participants income) the average reservation
price is calculated as 12 (
pricelevel1
0.65 +
pricelevel2
1.1 ), labeled WTA and WTP respectively.
Participants are then sorted according to their self reported loss aversion. The
WTA/WTP ratio can be calculated as the average WTA divided by the average
WTP . Figure 4 graphs the average WTA/WTP ratio for each of the seven loss
aversion categories. Also p-values of a Wald test with the null-hypothesis of the
WTA/WTP ratio being equal to 1.285 are reported. Observations in the seven cate-
gories range from 60 (loss aversion of 1) to 501 (loss aversion of 5). The WTA/WTP
ratio increases almost monotonically with loss aversion. The lowest ratio of 1.39 is
obtained for participants who indicate to be “not at all” loss averse, where the dif-
ference between the WTA and WTP is not statistically significant (t-value of -1.11,
not reported) and also the WTA/WTP ratio is not significantly different from 1.285
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(p-value of 0.7827). The WTA/WTP ratio increases then to 1.87 and 2.32 for par-
ticipants who indicate a loss aversion of 2 or 3, respectively. The WTA/WTP ratio is
now significantly greater than 1.285 on a 10% and 1% level. The ratio drops to 1.83
for participants with a loss aversion of 4, to increase monotonically afterwards. The
highest WTA/WTP ratio is observed for the most loss averse participants (ratio of
2.70). Also the ratio of 2.70 is significantly greater than the lowest ratio of 1.39 (5%
level, Wald test). Overall, hypothesis 2a is supported as.
[Figure 4 about here.]
5.5. Hypothesis 2b - WTA, WTP and loss aversion
According to hypothesis 2b, the increase in the average WTA/WTP ratio by loss
aversion should be caused by both, an increase in WTA and a decrease in WTP . To
get a first impression, figure 5 now displays the average WTA and WTP separately
for each of the seven loss aversion categories. There does not seem to be a relation
between loss aversion and the WTA. Therefore, the first part of hypothesis 2a cannot
be confirmed by this descriptive analysis. The second part, however, can be confirmed.
The average WTP strongly decreases with loss aversion. Participants who are “not
at all” loss averse indicate on average the highest WTP of EUR 1,695. The WTP
decreases by almost 50% to EUR 904 for the most loss averse participants.
[Figure 5 about here.]
Table 5 presents results of two OLS regressions, analyzing the WTA and WTP sep-
arately. The dependent variable is the logarithmized WTA (Columns 2 and 3) or
WTP (Columns 4 and 5) per participant, respectively.
[Table 5 about here.]
First, the logarithmized WTA is considered. The coefficient for loss aversion
is positive, indicating an increase in WTA of about 2% per unit increase in loss
aversion. However, the coefficient is insignificant. As suggested by figure 5, loss
aversion, therefore, seems to have no effect on the WTA.
Only one of the six control variables proofs to be significant. The WTA decreases
by about 5% for each year a participant plans to retire later. This negative effect is of
the same magnitude and significance as for the pooled regressions in table 3. Neither
risk aversion, financial literacy, the subjective life expectancy nor owning private
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pension insurance have a significant effect on the WTA. Also only two demographic
variables significantly influence the WTA. Per 1% increase of income, the WTA is
increased by about 0.4%. As the income effect in the pooled regression (table 3) is
stronger, income seems to effect the WTA less than it influences the WTP . This
makes sense, as the income is a upper bound for the WTP (you cannot give up more
than all monthly benefits) but not for the WTA. Additionally, being married (dummy)
increases the WTA by 16.83%.
The second part of table 5 presents OLS regression results for the WTP . Loss
aversion has a highly significant and economically meaningful effect. On average the
WTP for early retirement decreases by 10.10% for a one unit increase in self reported
loss aversion. The effect is robust to the inclusion of control variables and demo-
graphics. Therefore, hypothesis 2b can partly be confirmed. Loss aversion increases
the WTA/WTP ratio by significantly decreasing the WTP . The WTA, however, is
not affected by participants loss aversion. Three out of seven control variables have
significant effects on the WTP . Participants life expectancy as well as their planned
retirement age decreases the reservation price in the WTP scenario by about 1%
per additional year. The effect of risk aversion is also significant. More risk averse
participants have a higher reservation price for early retirement. This result is in
contrast with Coile et al. (2002) who theoretically show that delaying retirement is
more attractive with risk aversion.
In contrast to the WTA, the WTP depends highly on participants demographics.
Per year of age the WTP increases by 1.1%. The closer participants are to retirement,
the more they are willing to pay to retire early. The WTP increases by about 0.6%
per 1% increase in income. This effect is about 50% stronger than for the WTA.
Also being male, being married and having obtained a university degree increases the
WTP . All three effects are economically strong with an increase of 29.15% (male),
32.62% (married) and 47.94% (university degree), respectively.
The explanatory power of the WTP regression is more than 3 times as high as
for the WTA regression (adjusted R2 of 31.53% vs. 8.34%). This is driven by the
demographic variables. Even if the income is not included, the adjusted R2 remains by
about 20% (not reported). It seems that the WTP highly depends on demographics,
whereas the WTA seems to be driven by factors that are not captured in our study.
In summary, hypothesis 2b can be confirmed only partially. We observe the pre-
dicted effect of loss aversion only on the WTP but not on the WTA. In a narrow
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focus this can partly be treated as evidence for the Bateman et al. (1997) and Bate-
man et al. (2005) argument as we find loss aversion in money. On the other hand,
participants may not see the decision as a classic money vs. good problem. The
WTP decision could be interpreted as an exchange of distant future consumption
for near future leisure. Therefore, as loss aversion clearly exists in consumption (see
e.g. Horowitz and McConnell, 2002), our results can also be treated as evidence for
the Novemsky and Kahneman (2005) argument. This view can explain why we do
not find any loss aversion in the WTA case. The exchange of near future leisure for
distant future consumption seems to be perceived as a gain of future consumption.
Therefore, loss aversion does not effect the decision.
6. Robustness
The robustness of the previous results is analyzed using two datasets. First, the
FAZ-survey is used to test robustness regarding the hypothesis 1a. Therefore, a
relative measure of the reservation price and an inflated WTP is constructed. In
addition, the analysis is repeated with a reduced sample, where participants who
indicated a WTP of zero are excluded.
The second dataset comes from a representative panel survey for Germany. The
German SAVE panel is conducted since 2001 by the Munich Center for the Economics
of Aging (MEA) to understand savings and retirement decisions of German house-
holds. The panel focuses on savings behavior, financial assets and old-age provision
and includes numerous demographic, economic and psychological characteristics of
participating households. Two waves are used: 1) the cross-section of the 2009 wave
of the SAVE study where 2,222 households participated and 2) the cross-section of
the 2011/2012 wave with 1,660 participants. Two different waves are used as in the
2011/2012 wave some of the control variables are not elicited and therefore, the two
waves are merged to get a complete dataset. We are only able to test robustness
of hypothesis 1a and 1b, as in the SAVE study 2009 and 2011/2012 no information
about participants loss aversion is provided. For a detailed description of the survey
methodology (e.g. imputation of missing values) see Boersch-Supan et al. (2009).
6.1. FAZ-survey
Relative reservation price
The relative reservation price used in the following analysis is based on the social
security benefits at age 63. To understand the relative measure we go back to the
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example in section 5.1, where two participants with an income of EUR 1,000 are
assigned to the two different treatments. Both participants are given a hypothetical
pension value of EUR 650 per month. Assume both participants have the same relative
reservation price of for example +50% based on benefits at age 63. This would lead
to a absolute reservation price of 650 · 1.5− 650 = 325 in the WTA treatment and to
650− 650 · 11.5 = 217 in the WTP treatment. A WTA/WTP ratio of 325217 = 1.5 would
be observed, even if relative reservation prices are equal.
Table 6 presents results of an OLS regression with the logarithmized relative reser-
vation price (based on benefits at age 63) as dependent variable. Columns 2 and 4
present regression coefficients, columns 3 and 5 the respective t-values. Besides the
treatment dummy, demographics (including the fair price) and control variables are
included. The treatment dummy is highly significant and negative, confirming the
results of section 5.2. However, the magnitude of the effect is weaker, compared to
the original analysis. The relative reservation price increases by 69.56% (level 1) and
63.36% (level 2) in the WTA treatment. In addition, the negative effect of the fair
price is in line with the previous analysis. An increasing income leads to an increasing
fair price. Participants seem to increase their reservation price less strongly, leading
to a negative effect of the fair price on the relative reservation price. The absolute
reservation price, however, increases with the fair price (see table 3).
[Table 6 about here.]
Inflated WTP
A second robustness test regarding hypothesis 1a is conducted using an inflated
measure of the willingness-to-pay. In the previous analysis it is shown, that the fair
WTA/WTP ratio in our survey design is about 1.285. Therefore, the first inflated
measure of the WTP is constructed as WTP ·1.285. However, comparing the average
WTP in the level 1 and level 2 question in figure 1, it can be seen that the WTP
increase more strongly than the hypothetical pension value. The WTP increases by
+104.43% whereas the hypothetical value only increases by 1.10.65 − 1 = 69.23%. To
account for this “overreaction” a second inflated measure of the WTP is constructed
as WTP · 2.04431.6923 · 1.285 = WTP · 1.552.
Table 7 presents results of four OLS regressions with the logarithmized reservation
price as dependent variable. Thereby the WTP is inflated by 1.285 (columns 2 - 5)
and 1.552 (columns 6 - 9) respectively. In all cases the treatment dummy is positive
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and remains significant to the 1% level, confirming the robustness of hypothesis 1a.
[Table 7 about here.]
Reduced sample
The last robustness test regarding the FAZ-survey uses only a reduced sample.
Indicating a WTP of zero implies that someone would not even be willing to forgo
one Euro of monthly pension benefits in order to retire four years earlier. This could
for example be due to a high job satisfaction or a really constrained budget. A third
reason could be that participants did not want to answer the question and therefore,
simply typed in a value of zero. However, since we did not force participants to indi-
cate a reservation price at all (they could also leave the field blank) this explanation
seems unlikely. In our sample, 175 (level 1) and 92 (level 2) participants indicated a
zero WTP. In contrast, only 27 (level 1) and 47 (level 2) participants indicated a WTA
of zero. To analyze whether our results are driven by this difference, the analysis from
section 5.2 is repeated without the participants that indicate a WTP of zero. Thereby
the average WTP increases from 327.09 to 394.18 (level 1) and from 668.66 to 733.90
(level 2). Table 8 presents the reduced sample regression results. The treatment
dummy is significant in both regressions, level 1 and level 2. The overall effect of an
increasing reservation price in the WTA treatment is confirmed. However, excluding
participants with a WTP of zero weakens the results in two ways: 1) the t-value of
the treatment dummy decreases from about 18 to 10 (level 1) and from 9.5 to 3.5
(level 2), respectively. 2) Also the magnitude of the effect decreases strongly. In the
level 1 (level 2) regression, being assigned to the WTA treatment now increases the
reservation price by only 75.80% (26.04%), compared to 313.55% (110.29%) for the
analysis presented in table 3. In summary, parts of the significance and magnitude of
the WTA/WTP effect in the original analysis is driven by participants which indicate
a WTP of zero. However, the main effect remains robust to the exclusion of these
participants.
[Table 8 about here.]
6.2. SAVE Panel
Robustness SAVE - hypothesis 1a
Using the SAVE panel for robustness comes with the advantage of a representative
sample of the German population. We are able to test whether the results obtained
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in the previous analysis are driven by the fact that FAZ readers present a high in-
come - high education sample. Nevertheless, there are also two drawbacks: 1) the
WTA/WTP questions in SAVE are not identical to our questions as they refer to
working one year longer or one year shorter compared to a planned retirement age.
2) The questions were not mandatory and therefore, only few participants answered
them. However, even if the questions are not identical to our survey, they give a good
impression of the robustness of our results.
In the 2011 wave of the SAVE panel the following question for participants who will
receive social security benefits in the future was included: “in order to retire one year
earlier, would you be willing to give up a part of your monthly benefits?” Participants
could then indicate a percentage of their monthly benefits they would be willing to give
up or answer with “no” or “I don’t know”. Of the 1,660 participants 835 were already
retired (775) or indicated that they will not receive social security benefits in the future
(60). Of the remaining 825 participants, 148 gave a percentage value, 345 indicated
that they would not be willing to give up any monthly benefits and 332 answered with
“I don’t know”. We treat this question as a willingness-to-pay scenario as participants
indicate a reservation price for early retirement from a perspective where they have to
retire later. Only the 148 observations of participants indicating a percentage value
are used. A second question, within subjects, in the 2011/2012 SAVE survey is used
as willingness-to-accept scenario: “would you be willing to retire one year later if
your social security benefits would be increased?” Again participants could indicate
a percentage, or answer with “no” and “I don’t know”. Here 87 participants gave a
percentage value, 459 indicated that they would not be willing to work longer, 279
“did not know”. Again, only the 87 participants indicating a percentage value enter
the analysis. Robustness therefore is tested using the reservation price in percent
decrease or increase of monthly social security benefits. Similar to our survey, the
SAVE survey includes a set of financial literacy questions (9 questions, see Appendix
B), the subjective life expectancy, the planned retirement age and whether or not
participants own private pension insurance.
Since the sample presents only a small selection of the whole SAVE dataset, we
test whether participants in our sample systematically differ from participants which
answered “no” or “I don’t know”. A logistic regression with an indicator variable that
equals one if a participant indicated a percentage value and zero otherwise shows that
gender, subjective life expectancy and financial literacy are significant predictors for
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indicating a percentage value (regression results not reported). A mean comparison
test confirms these results. There are 54.22% male participants in the sample indicat-
ing a percentage value, whereas only 40.45% of participants in the “no or I don’t know
sample” are male. This difference presents a problem insofar as already in the FAZ-
survey men are overrepresented and the SAVE dataset is used to test robustness for a
more representative sample. However, with 45.78% of female participants, the SAVE
data is by far “more representative” regarding gender. The significant difference in
life expectancy and financial literacy is economically weak. Participants who enter
a percentage value indicate a life expectancy that is on average only 1.66% higher
compared to the “no or I don’t know sample”. Also, the average financial literacy is
only 6.11% higher. The small sample does not differ strongly from the representative
SAVE dataset and therefore is used to test the robustness of our results.
Figure 6 present the reservation price for early retirement in the SAVE panel under
the WTA and WTP treatment as well as the WTAWTP ratio and the t-statistic of a dif-
ference in means test. The average reservation price in the WTA treatment (23.31%)
is about 3.3 times larger than in the WTP treatment (7.11%). This difference is
highly significant with a t-statistic of -7.05. The ratio of 3.3 is higher compared to
the results in our survey presented in figure 1. This could be due to the fact that the
SAVE question is slightly different. The WTA could be larger because it represents
the reservation price for working one additional year compared to the planned retire-
ment age and the WTP is elicited for working one year less than planned (an not for
working until planned retirement age).
[Figure 6 about here.]
To analyze the SAVE data in a regression framework the logarithmized percentage
values are used16. Table 9 presents results of an OLS regression with the logarithmized
reservation price as dependent variable and demographic and controls as independent
variables.
[Table 9 about here.]
As in the main analysis, the effect of the WTA dummy is positive and highly
significant. The reservation price increases on average by exp(1.1604− 120.12712)−1 =
16Similar to the absolute EUR values in the FAZ-survey, the percentage values follow a log-normal
distribution.
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216.55% in the WTA treatment. The magnitude of the effect is also comparable
to the effect in the main analysis for the level 1 regression (increase of 313% in
the WTA treatment; see table 3). The main result therefore is confirmed using the
representative SAVE dataset. In addition, the gender dummy is now significant. 45%
of SAVE participants who indicated a percentage value in the WTA/WTP question
are female. In the main analysis (FAZ-survey), this is only true for 16%. The higher
variation in the gender dummy may explain the now significant effect. Women seem
to have a stronger preference for early retirement and therefore indicate a higher
reservation price. This result is in line with Munnell et al. (2004) and Moen and
Flood (2013) who report that women are more likely to retire early.
Robustness SAVE - hypothesis 1b
In the German pension system, the percentage increase of social security benefits
for an additional year of employment depends on 2 factors: 1) the age of the employee
compared to his full retirement age determines whether the benefits are increased by
3.6% (if the age is at least one year below the full retirement age) or 6.0% (if the
age is equal or greater than the full retirement age). 2) The income in the additional
year determines the additional earning points added to the social security account of
the employee. The question in the SAVE survey refers to working one year longer
or shorter than planned. Therefore, to calculate an indicator for late retirement the
planned retirement age and the full retirement age of each participant is taken into
account. In the WTA question, participants are asked for a percentage change
in social security benefits for working one year longer than planned. If the planned
retirement age is equal or greater than the full retirement age the fair price would be
6.0% + the percentage increase in earning points. For a planned retirement age smaller
than the full retirement age the fair price would be 3.6% + the percentage increase in
earning points. The WTP question refers to working one year shorter. Therefore
the fair price is 6.0% + the percentage decrease in earning points if the planned
retirement age is greater than the full retirement age and 3.6% + the percentage
decrease in earning points if planned retirement age is smaller or equal to the full
retirement age. It is assumed that all participants are employed since the age of
25 and that the income in the additional/deducting year equals the average income.
Therefore, the percentage change in earning points is calculated as 1PRA−25 , with PRA
being the planned retirement age. The indicator variable late retirement equals 1 if
a participant’s reservation price is smaller than his or her fair price and 0 otherwise.
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This indicator equals 1 for 121 of the 239 observations (50.63%).
Table 10 presents result of a logistic regression with late retirement as dependent
variable. Asking participants for an WTA significantly decreases the likelihood of
late retirement. The coefficient of -2.690 is significant on the 1%-level. With an av-
erage marginal effect over all observations of -47.43% percentage points, the effect is
also economically strong. The gender dummy has a significant and positive effect.
Being male increases the probability for late retirement on average by 11.80 percent-
age points. The effects of the planned retirement age and owning a private pension
insurance are also positive, however, only marginal significant.
In summary, both hypotheses, 1a and 1b, can be confirmed using the SAVE
dataset. The results therefore, seem not to be driven by more wealthy and highly
educated participants in the FAZ survey.
[Table 10 about here.]
7. Policy Implications
Pay-as-you-go pension systems of many developed countries are put under pres-
sure through increasing life expectancy, decreasing birthrates and the baby boomers
generation entering retirement. As a result, the ratio of working people to retirees
is constantly decreasing. Governments of Germany, the US, U.K, France and many
other European countries reacted to this development by increasing the full retirement
age. This step was necessary as in most countries people retire significant earlier than
the full retirement age (see for example Behaghel and Blau, 2012; Boersch-Supan,
2000). Therefore, it is important to understand what drives peoples retirement deci-
sion besides the full retirement age.
Before we get to possible policy implications, it has to be analyzed who will be
affected by the different treatments of the decision problem. If a participant’s WTA
is smaller than the price of early retirement, we can assume that his or her decision
will not be affected by a different presentation of the problem. This is because a
reduction in his or her reservation price would not lead to a different decision and,
in general, the WTA is greater than the WTP. The same holds for participants who
indicate a WTP that is already greater than the fair price. A participant, therefore,
is classified as possibly affected by the presentation of decision problem if the WTA >
fair price or WTP < fair price. Following this classification, in the level 1 scenario of
the FAZ-survey 1,538 (64.65%) and in the level 2 scenario 1,469 (59.25%) participants
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are possibly affected. Therefore, implications are relevant for the majority of partici-
pants. A second important issue is the external validity of our results. The income in
our sample is significantly higher than the average income in Germany. Therefore it
is tested, whether there is a relation between being possibly affected and participants
income. A simple mean comparison test shows that the average income of the 1,538
participants who are classified as possibly affected (level 1) is significantly (1%-level)
lower (- 410.62 EUR per month) compared to the not affected group. This result is
also confirmed in a logistic regression with demographic and control variables (not
reported). A second indication towards the external validity comes from the repre-
sentative SAVE data. Here the number of participants who are possibly affected is
with 70.29% even bigger compared to the FAZ-survey. Therefore, we conclude that
our results have implications for the majority of the population.
The results of this study have two important implications: 1) we find that the
WTA/WTP disparity also exists in a retirement context. People on average indicate
a reservation price for early retirement which is lower than the fair price if the decision
is presented in a WTP context. The opposite is true for the presentation in a WTA
context. Policy makers, therefore, should pay massive attention on how they present
information about social security payments. 2) As stated above, one way to increase
the retirement age is to increase the full retirement age. However, also the social
security information letter that is provided by the government represents a powerful
tool to increase the effective retirement age. Former studies show that already small
changes in a presentation format can lead to different decisions (e.g. Choi et al., 2013).
Combined with the results of this study, policy makers should consider changes in the
information letter as a second device, next to increasing the full retirement age.
8. Conclusion
This paper relates the retirement decision with the willingness-to-accept/willingness-
to-pay disparity. In an online survey participants indicate their reservation price for
early retirement as their WTA or WTP, respectively. In line with the WTA/WTP
literature, we find that the WTA is about two times greater than the WTP. When
comparing the market price for early retirement, measured as reduction of monthly
social security benefits according to the German pension system, with participants
reservation price, we find that early retirement seems especially attractive for partic-
ipants answering the WTA question. The average probability of early retirement is
29
about 28-37 percentage points higher when the reservation price is elicited as a WTA
compared to a WTP. Additionally, we analyze the cause of the high WTA/WTP
ratio. Loss aversion significantly increases the ratio, however, not by increasing the
WTA but by decreasing the WTP. This finding is in contrast with the most prominent
explanation for the WTA/WTP disparity, namely an endowment effect caused by loss
aversion. Participants seem to perceive the exchange of money for early retirement as
a loss and therefore are willing to pay less the more loss averse they are. Giving up
early retirement in exchange for money, however, is not perceived as a loss and loss
aversion has no significant effect on the WTA.
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Figure 1: WTA/WTP ratio and average reservation price for early retirement depending on the
treatment (WTA vs. WTP) and level (65% or 110%)
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Figure 2: Distribution of the dependent variable, reservation price [EUR] and logarithmized reser-
vation price [EUR], by level.
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Figure 3: Fair price and average reservation price for early retirement depending on the treatment
(WTA vs. WTP) and level (65% or 110%)
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Figure 4: Average WTA/WTP ratio by loss aversion
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Figure 5: Average WTA and WTP by loss aversion
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Figure 6: WTA/WTP ratio and average reservation price (in per cent of monthly social security
benefits)) for early retirement depending on the treatment (WTA vs. WTP). Data used for robustness
is from the German SAVE panel, waves 2009 and 2011/2012.
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Figure 7: Page 1 of the social security information letter with short translation.
Pension benefits („Regelaltersrente“) that can be paid if the full retirement age is 
reached amounts to 736,79 EUR per month. For this calculation only the contributions 
until today are taken into account. You will reach full retirement age on 03.08.2017. 
If you contribution until you reach full retirement age would amount the average 
contribution of the last five years, pension benefits would amount to 882,40 EUR per 
month at full retirement age. 
a 
b 
a 
b 
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Figure 8: Page 5 of the social security information letter with short translation.
Besides pension benefits at full retirement age it is also possible to claim benefits 
earlier. This will permanently reduce pension benefits as well as a possible dependent’s 
pension.  
 
The reduction amounts to 0.3% per each month of early claiming. 
c 
c 
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Figure 9: Page 8 of the social security information letter with short translation.
(The following is true for people that contributed at least 35 years): 
You will receive full pension benefits at 01.09.2017 (NRA). The earliest you can claim 
benefits is 01.03.2015. Claiming early will lead to a reduction of 9% of benefits. 
 
d 
d 
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Figure 10: Financial literacy questions 1-6 in the FAZ survey.
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Figure 11: Financial literacy questions 1-9 in the SAVE 2009 survey.
1. Suppose you have € 100 in a savings account earning 2 percent interest a year. After five years, how much 
would you have? 
 More than € 102. 
 Exactly € 102. 
 Less than € 102. 
 Don’t know. 
2. Suppose you have € 100 in a savings account earning 20 percent interest a year. After five years, how much 
would you have? 
 More than € 200. 
 Exactly € 200. 
 Less than € 200. 
 Don’t know. 
3. Imagine that the interest rate on your savings account is 1 percent a year and inflation is 2 percent a year. After 
one year, would the money in the account buy more than it does today, exactly the same or less than today? 
 More. 
 Same. 
 Less. 
 Don’t know. 
4. Suppose that in the year 2012, your income has doubled and prices of all goods have doubled too. In 2012, 
how much will you be able to buy with your income? 
 More than today. 
 The same. 
 Less than today. 
 Don’t know. 
5. Normally, which asset displays the highest fluctuation over time? 
 Savings account. 
 Bonds. 
 Stocks. 
 Don’t know. 
6. Which of the following statements describes the main function of the stock market? 
 The stock market helps to predict stock earnings. 
 The stock market results in an increase in the price of stocks. 
 The stock market brings people who want to buy stocks together with those who want to sell stocks. 
 None of the above. 
 Don’t know. 
7. Buying a company stock usually provides a safer return than a stock mutual fund. True or false? 
 True. 
 False. 
 Don’t know. 
8. Which of the following statements is correct? 
 Once one invests in a mutual fund, one cannot withdraw the money in the first year. 
 Mutual funds can invest in several assets, for example invest in both stocks and bonds. 
 Mutual funds pay a guaranteed rate of return which depends on their past performance. 
 None of the above. 
 Don’t know. 
9. If interest rates rise, what will typically happen to bond prices?  
 Bond prices will rise. 
 Bond prices will stay the same. 
 Bond prices will fall. 
 Don’t know. 
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Table 1: Hypothesized influence of loss aversion on the willingness-to-accept and
willingness-to-pay
good in possession can be traded for loss aversion will
WTA early retirement money increase WTA
WTP money early retirement decrease WTP
47
Table 2: Online survey summary statistics
Variable Mean (Median) Std. Dev.
Reservation Price
Reservation Price - Level 1 (65%) 549.07 (300.00) 835.95
Reservation Price - Level 2 (110%) 973.84 (500.00) 1544.45
Demographics
Age 40.37 (40.00) 12.34
Gender 0.84 0.36
Income 3,436.92 (3,000.00) 3,118.14
Number of Children 0.79 1.19
High School Degree 0.92 0.27
University Degree 0.68 0.47
Married 0.47 0.50
Controls
Risk Aversion (1-7) 3.87 1.47
Loss Aversion (1-7) 4.23 1.60
Financial Literacy Standard (0-4) 3.51 0.71
Financial Literacy Extra (0-2) 0.62 0.74
Life Expectancy (Males) 83.33 (84.00) 8.12
Life Expectancy (Females) 84.33 (85.00) 6.95
Planed Retirement Age (in month) 777.14 (780.00) 50.77
Owns Private Pension Insurance 0.64 0.48
Certainty of Social Security (1-7) 2.97 1.78
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Table 9: Robustness - Hypothesis 1a: results of OLS regressions with the logarithmized
reservation price for early retirement as dependent variable. The reservation price is measured in per
cent of expected social security benefits per month. Data used for robustness is from the German
SAVE panel, waves 2009 and 2011/2012. ***, ** and * indicate significance on the 1%, 5% and
10%-level.
Reservation Price [%]
Variable Coeff. t-value
Demographics
Age -0.004 -0.60
Gender -0.271** -2.19
Income (log) 0.008 0.06
Number of Children -0.031 -0.45
High School Degree -0.185 -1.18
University Degree -0.267 -1.42
Married -0.130 -0.86
Treatment
WTA treatment (1=WTA, 0=WTP) 1.160*** 9.13
Controls
Financial Literacy Score (0-9) -0.042 -0.66
Life Expectancy -0.013 -1.63
Planned Retirement Age (years) -0.048*** -2.67
Owns Private Pension Insurance -0.092 -0.76
Constant 6.437*** 4.29
Avg. Number of Obs. 240
Avg. Number of Clusters 225
Avg. Adj. R2 0.3489
Notes:
(1) The SAVE data is multiply imputed with five different implicates. All five implicates are
used.
(2) Coefficients and standard errors are calculated according to Rubin (1987).
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Table 10: Robustness - Hypothesis 1b: results of logistic regressions with an indicator
variable for late retirement as dependent variable. Data used for robustness is from the German
SAVE panel, waves 2009 and 2011/2012. ***, ** and * indicate significance on the 1%, 5% and
10%-level.
Late Retirement
Variable Coeff. z-value
Demographics
Age -0.019 -1.02
Gender 0.646* 1.82
Income (log) 0.385 0.81
Number of Children 0.037 0.20
High School Degree -0.170 -0.37
University Degree 0.741 1.35
Married 0.128 0.30
Treatment
WTA treatment (1=WTA, 0=WTP) -2.300*** -6.01
Controls
Financial Literacy Score (0-9) 0.030 0.17
Life Expectancy -0.001 -0.03
Planned Retirement Age (years) 0.102* 1.89
Owns Private Pension Insurance 0.574* 1.73
Constant -9.141* -1.81
Avg. Number of Obs. 240
Avg. Number of Clusters 225
Avg. Correctly classified 0.7114
Avg. Area under ROC Curve 0.7905
Notes:
(1) The SAVE data is multiply imputed with five different implicates. All five implicates are
used.
(2) Coefficients and standard errors are calculated according to Rubin (1987).
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